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“ENCROACHMENTS AND OPPRESSIONS”:  
THE CORPORATIZATION OF PROCEDURE 
AND THE DECLINE OF RULE OF LAW 
J. Maria Glover* 
INTRODUCTION 
The civil liability system in the United States has been criticized for 
decades.  Corporate litigants and lobbyists in particular have pushed to 
restrict an “explosion” of “abusive”1 civil litigation and liability exposure.  
To reduce that exposure, corporate entities have engaged in attempts to 
curtail rules of substantive liability and have sought extensive procedural 
reform including heightened pleading standards, stricter summary judgment 
standards, heightened class-certification standards, arbitration agreements 
with class action waivers, and countless others.  Corporate entities have 
pursued these procedural reforms as litigants and as lobbyists, restructuring 
our litigation system by appealing to both the legislative and judicial 
branches of government. 
Despite the existence of dual-branch power over procedure, the ability of 
corporate entities to pursue procedural reform in almost equal measure from 
the judicial and legislative branches is a relatively recent historical 
development.  For over four decades after the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were promulgated, Congress barely dipped its toe in procedural 
waters even though Congress retains ultimate power over procedure.2  
Congress chose instead to defer to the expertise and institutional advantages 
of the judiciary in matters of litigation management.3  Congressional 
deference to the judicial branch in matters procedural began to wane 
 
*  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  I would like to thank Ben Zipursky, 
Nora Freeman Engstrom, Myriam Gilles, David Marcus, Howard Erichson, and Bill Treanor 
for helpful comments.  Katy Ho provided excellent research assistance.  This Article was 
prepared for the Colloquium entitled Access to Justice and the Legal Profession in an Era of 
Contracting Civil Liability, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law 
and Ethics on October 27, 2017, at Fordham University School of Law. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Briana Lynn Rosenbaum, The RICO Trend in Class Action Warfare, 102 
IOWA L. REV. 165, 175 (2016); The Litigation Explosion, ONLINE LEGAL, http://www.online-
legal.biz/robert-m/the-litigation-explosion/ [https://perma.cc/24NP-PUDK] (last visited Mar. 
15, 2018).  
 2. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power:  The Role of Congress, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1681–82 (2004). 
 3. Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 
443 (1958).   
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sometime around the 1980s4 when Congress developed a sense that the Rules 
Advisory Committee was exercising its rulemaking power in ways that 
concealed an agenda to recalibrate substantive pronouncements of Congress 
and to reduce access to court for certain litigants.5  In other words, Congress 
initially intervened in matters of judicial procedure to preserve access to 
justice and the rule of law. 
While Congress’s involvement in procedural matters has continued—
indeed, increased—since that time, its agenda has changed.  Lobbied by 
corporate entities, recent procedural reforms by Congress have tended to 
restrict access to justice and rule of law rather than preserve it.  More than 
that, what began in the 1970s and 1980s as perhaps Congress’s simple 
policing of the boundaries of judicial power has turned into an all-out power 
struggle:  the judiciary often claims as much power as it can over procedure 
even when the exercise of that power impacts congressional enactments.  
Congress does the same even when its power grabs cut back at the judicial 
power and expertise regarding procedure and case management.  Together, 
the result is that both Congress and the federal courts (particularly the U.S. 
Supreme Court) are reforming procedure in ways that restrict access to justice 
and diminish rule-of-law norms. 
The big winner in this power struggle has been neither the judicial nor the 
legislative branch but, instead, corporate entities seeking (often successfully) 
to limit exposure to liability by restricting access to justice, particularly for 
low-income individuals, those with low-value claims, or citizens with little 
political power.  This power struggle has provided corporate entities with two 
bites at the procedural apple.  If corporations are the big winner in this 
struggle, there must be a big loser.  That loser has been the rule of law.  If 
corporations have been the ones to succeed in this struggle, there must be a 
failure—the failure of the judiciary to fulfill its unique role in our tripartite 
structure of government to preserve the rule of law. 
This judicial role to preserve the rule of law goes back to the time of the 
framing, where the judicial branch was set apart as separate from political 
processes6 that might contaminate justice, fairness, objectivity, and other 
rule-of-law values.  While relatively little time was spent discussing the 
judicial branch at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, one of its principal 
architects—Alexander Hamilton—devoted much ink to developing its 
 
 4. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1705–06.  
 5. See id. at 1704.  
 6. See, e.g., William M. Treanor, The Genius of Hamilton and the Birth of the Modern 
Theory of the Judiciary, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FEDERALIST (Jack Rakove & 
Colleen Sheehan eds., forthcoming 2018).  When speaking on the radical nature of Hamilton’s 
ideas, one of the most prominent antifederalist opponents of Hamilton’s view of the judiciary 
stated, “[N]othing could have been better conceived to facilitate the abolition of the state 
governments than the constitution of the judicial.” Brutus XV (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in 
16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 431, 434 (John 
P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1986).  Indeed, Blackstone’s Commentaries treated the judiciary as 
part of the executive branch. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *267; see also 
FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM:  THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 210 (1985) (characterizing the judiciary as “a subordinate of the executive”). 
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contours and characteristics.  Hamilton’s vision for the judiciary was a radical 
one at the time.  He, along with James Madison, ultimately rendered the 
radical decidedly nonradical—so much so that Hamilton’s conception of the 
federal judiciary was embodied in Article III with little protest.7  Chief among 
Hamilton’s characteristics for the federal judiciary was a stalwart 
commitment and unique ability to preserving the rule of law.8  This 
commitment to rule of law could only be realized by a structure that 
prevented “encroachments and oppressions” from the legislative branch.9  
Rather than serving as a bulwark against the “encroachments and 
oppressions” of the political branches of government,10 the current judiciary 
has become enmeshed in a procedural power struggle that hinders its ability 
to serve this role and has even, in recent years, been complicit in the corporate 
takeover of procedure.11 
This Article begins by providing a brief account of the corporatization of 
procedure through judicial decision-making and noting some of the 
detrimental effects it has had on the preservation of rule of law and access to 
justice.  Part II goes on to explore how the judiciary does not retain full 
control over procedure and how corporate entities have little care for whether 
a procedural reform simply cuts back at litigation or goes further and cuts 
back at judicial power and the judicial role itself.  To illustrate these points, 
Part II examines the most recent attempt at “procedural reform” by corporate 
entities—the proposed Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act (FICALA).  
The most dramatic procedural changes in FICALA involve multidistrict 
litigation (MDL).  These changes would cut back significantly at judicial 
power and discretion as well as the role of the judiciary in preserving the rule 
of law.  Part III explores one of the implications of having two political 
branches and one nonpolitical branch of government—namely, that moneyed 
corporate interests effectively get two bites at the procedural apple.  This state 
of affairs raises a number of fundamental questions, including ones regarding 
the appropriate nature and scope of legislative and judicial power over 
procedure.  Part III grapples with those questions. 
 
 7. See Treanor, supra note 6, at 3.  
 8. See id.  
 9. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that judicial independence was 
critical for the judiciary to preserve the rule of law).  
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT 130–
81 (2017); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability:  The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of 
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 377–79 (2005); J. Maria Glover, 
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3054–56 
(2015) [hereinafter Glover, Disappearing Claims]; J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s 
“Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1625, 1637 (2017) [hereinafter 
Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action]; Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes:  The 
Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 
YALE L.J. 2804, 2809–11 (2015). 
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I.  THE CORPORATIZATION OF PROCEDURE BY THE JUDICIARY  
Countless scholars, myself included, have traced myriad instances in 
which corporate interests have achieved procedural reform through judicial 
avenues.  Often these interests do so in ways that hinder access to justice and 
the effectuation of rule-of-law norms.12  The judiciary has done so not so 
much through interpreting actual substantive rules governing primary 
conduct, though it has engaged in that practice as well,13 but instead through 
less politically salient procedural decision-making.14  At times, the very 
judiciary tasked with guarding the rule of law, as Hamilton envisioned, has 
enabled “encroachments and oppressions” upon that role.  Many of these 
reforms are undoubtedly motivated by the judicial branch’s disenchantment 
with civil litigation.15 
These procedural reforms, particularly those introduced by the Supreme 
Court, are well known.  To name a few recent ones, the Court has ratcheted 
up pleading requirements, thus making survival of motions to dismiss more 
difficult.16  The Court has fully embraced arbitration agreements that prohibit 
class actions and—at least under the language of its opinion in American 
 
 12. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413–17 (2014); 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432–35 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
564 U.S. 338, 365–67 (2011); Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11, 
at 1665.  
 14. See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in 
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1176–79 (2012) (discussing how procedural 
decisions have made certain sorts of claims more difficult to bring, thus diminishing certain 
regulatory regimes that rely heavily upon private enforcement); see, e.g., Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (holding that foreign corporations 
are only subject to general jurisdiction where they are “at home”); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (same); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 
2311–12 (2013) (holding that arbitration agreements are enforceable according to their terms, 
regardless of whether provisions in such agreements mean that no plaintiff will able to bring 
a claim); Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1433–35 (narrowing the economic modeling of antitrust 
injury, and possibly the economic modeling of damages in class actions, at Comcast’s urging); 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (stating that 
foreign corporations are only subject to general jurisdiction where they are “at home”); J. 
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 888 (2011) (holding that U.S. courts do not 
have personal jurisdiction over a foreign company who does business in, distributes products 
in, and encourages distributors to sell in the United States, and whose products caused injury 
to a plaintiff in a particular state); Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 365–67 (restricting Rule 23 at 
Wal-Mart’s urging); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343–44 (2011) 
(permitting class action prohibitions in AT&T’s particular arbitration agreement, despite the 
fact that such a holding would nullify most of plaintiffs’ claims); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007) (ratcheting up pleading requirements at the urging of the 
corporate defendant Bell Atlantic). 
 15. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the 
Merits:  Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 367 
n.299 (2013); Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court, Chief Justice’s 2015 Year-End Report on 
the Federal Judiciary (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2015year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAE9-JT5K] (comparing discovery to duels). 
 16. J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713. 1740–
41 (2012); Colin T. Reardon, Note, Pleading in the Information Age, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2170, 
2206 (2010). 
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Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant17—agreements that may well go 
further in restricting countless other procedural mechanisms.  It has narrowed 
courts’ authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over corporate entities 
foreign and domestic.  It has ratcheted up the commonality and predominance 
requirements under Rule 23 for class certification, and lower federal courts 
have ratcheted up requirements of ascertainability—all of which make it far 
more difficult to pursue claims as a class.  And the list goes on. 
At least two prominent scholars have argued that these and other 
procedural opinions evince an “anti-court Court.”18  If that is correct, then 
perhaps the power struggle is irrelevant; both branches are serving the same 
functional master—namely, to place power over rule of law and judicial 
procedure more firmly in the hands of the elected legislature.  Respectfully, 
I disagree with that anticourt assessment.  These are not the opinions of a 
judiciary eager to cede its power.19  If anything, the Court in recent years has 
taken many opportunities, through procedural opinions, to maintain or 
increase its power.20  These recent decisions indicate that the Court and parts 
of the federal judiciary are anti-litigation21—more specifically, anti-
litigation vis-à-vis certain types of claims and certain types of plaintiffs22—
and pro-court power.  As such, in their anti-litigation opinions, the courts are 
sensitive not only to preserving their procedural power but also to stretching 
that power to or beyond its limits, rendering (often implicit) substantive 
judgments and substantive policy preferences.23 
This distinction between an “anti-court Court” and an anti-litigation Court 
has critical implications for understanding the consequences of a procedural 
power struggle both for corporate entities and for the rule of law.  Across the 
litigation landscape, the judiciary seems willing to abdicate its role in 
preserving the rule of law but unwilling to give away any of its power over 
procedure and, often by extension, its power over substantive policy 
preferences.  This leaves an enormous window for corporations to pursue 
procedural reform in the judicial arena.  Yet, if the corporations are 
unsuccessful, they are able to seek refuge from a Congress now accustomed 
to routine intervention into matters of judicial procedure. 
 
 17. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 18. David Cole, The Anti-Court Court, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2014 (book review), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/08/14/anti-court-supreme-court/ 
[https://perma.cc/3JX9-PFNP]. 
 19. See id. (arguing that the Roberts Court is keen to reduce the power of the federal 
judiciary). 
 20. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Glover, “Non-
Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11.  
 21. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Am. Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 
(2011); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Scott, 550 
U.S. 372.  
 22. See Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11, at 1647–48 (noting 
the Court’s seeming preference for suits by institutional investors who tend to be sophisticated, 
versus consumers who tend not to be and who tend to be parties in lawyer-driven suits); Miller, 
supra note 15, at 367.  
 23. See Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11, at 1637–53.  
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Indeed, corporations pushing procedural reform are at best indifferent as 
to whether they achieve their ends as litigant or lobbyist.  Corporate 
defendants are used to getting their way with a federal judiciary hostile to 
litigation in general and aggregate litigation in particular.24  Nonetheless, 
corporate defendants have no compunction about turning to other branches 
for a second bite at the procedural apple—and strategically, why should they?  
The results of this dual bite, however, are procedural-reform efforts that 
diminish judicial power over procedure and the management of courts, as 
well as the rule of law.25 
The most recent procedural reform effort, FICALA, is currently pending 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee.26  FICALA would achieve broad-
sweeping procedural change that cuts at the core of the judicial power to 
manage cases and preserve the rule of law.  The next Part of this Article uses 
FICALA to illustrate how power struggles over procedure between the 
judicial and legislative branches provide corporate entities vast opportunities 
to reduce litigation exposure and, as the judiciary becomes less 
“independent,” have the potential to cut back at the judicial role to preserve 
the rule of law. 
II.  “ENCROACHMENTS AND OPPRESSIONS” OF JUDICIAL POWER 
AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE:  THE EXAMPLE OF FICALA 
Despite the words “class action” in FICALA’s title, the class action 
provisions are not the big-ticket items in this bill, even if they would achieve 
some long-standing class action-restrictive goals of corporate entities.  
Instead, and particularly given that the class action is already rather enfeebled 
from various recent Court pronouncements, the real game in town for 
aggregate litigation has become the MDL.  The MDL reform proposals in 
FICALA would have not only sweeping anti-litigation effects—effects the 
judiciary has in recent years been willing to effectuate—but also significant 
 
 24. See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); 
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746; Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304; Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 
27 (2013) (suggesting that damages had to be common for a class to be certified); Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873; Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 (2011) (ratcheting up the standard under 23(a) 
to one of predominance under 23(b)); AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. 333; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679–80 (confirming that 
plausibility pleading standards apply across all federal cases); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (discussing settlement pressure and discovery cost).  
 25. Corporate entities began meaningfully looking to Congress to obtain procedural 
reform in the 1980s. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C 
§ 78u-4 (2012) (providing a heightened pleading standard for securities fraud claims making 
it harder for plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss for such claims); Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2012) (same); Class Action Fairness Act 
of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012) (reconfiguring the balance of state and federal 
jurisdiction, thereby reducing the number of classes certified and ultimately brought). 
 26. See H.R. 985—Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim 
Transparency Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/985/all-actions [https://perma.cc/NZV9-VYQ2] (last visited Mar. 15, 
2018) (showing the most recent update of the bill on March 13, 2017, when it was referred to 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary). 
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anticourt effects.  These latter effects, which cut at the heart of judicial 
power, are not effects the judiciary seems particularly keen to hasten, and 
they are achieved through purely procedural provisions. 
A.  House Bill 985 Section 105(i):  “Allegations Verification” 
Starting with subsection (i) of section 105 of FICALA, entitled 
“Allegations Verification,” personal injury plaintiffs would be required to 
submit what is known in the MDL process as a “fact sheet.”27  These fact 
sheets must contain support for the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint, 
including injury causation, and plaintiffs must submit them within forty-five 
days after the action is placed with the MDL judge.28  The provision 
expressly states that this deadline “shall not be extended.”29  After 
submission, the MDL judge must review each fact statement within ninety 
days and decide whether it provides sufficient evidence for plaintiff’s case to 
proceed.30 
This provision, written and supported by various corporate entities,31 
responds to what many attorneys in the defense bar perceive as inadequate 
screening of unmeritorious cases.32  To be sure, to the extent some MDL 
plaintiffs are being added to plaintiff inventories with little more than a 
signature and with no screening,33 there ought to be careful evaluation of 
MDL procedures and possible reforms.34  The reforms proposed in 
section 105(i), however, are not only premature absent empirical data but 
would also not achieve accurate screening.  Instead, they would encroach on 
judicial power by creating potentially insurmountable burdens for MDL 
 
 27. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105(i) (2017). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See The Growth of Multidistrict Litigation:  Emerging Issues and Possible Solutions, 
LAW & ECON. CTR. (June 16, 2017), http://masonlec.org/events/the-growth-of-multidistrict-
litigation-emerging-issues-and-possible-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/E5QL-TTLK].  At the 
event, it was mentioned that the law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, which 
represents Johnson & Johnson in various MDL matters, helped draft this provision based on 
its experience on the ground with MDL litigation. 
 32. See, e.g., The Impact of Lawsuit Abuse on American Small Business and Job Creators:  
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 35–37 (2017) (statement of John 
H. Beisner, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP); “Gateway to the West” 
Becomes “Gateway to the Courts” for Dubious Science and High Damage Awards, AM. TORT 
REFORM FOUND. (May 23, 2016), http://www.judicialhellholes.org/2016/05/23/gateway-to-
the-west-becomes-the-gateway-to-the-courts-for-dubious-science-and-high-damage-awards/ 
[https://perma.cc/D358-HTJ2] (arguing that jury awards to plaintiffs who claimed that 
Johnson & Johnson talcum powder caused cancer were unmeritorious); Multidistrict 
Litigation (MDL) Conference, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Oct. 18, 2017), https://fedsoc.org/ 
conferences/multidistrict-litigation-mdl-conference?#agenda-item-eliminating-meritless-
claims [https://perma.cc/J8QJ-ZX3J] (discussing the “problem” of unmeritorious cases, 
particularly tag-along cases, in MDL). 
 33. See generally John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving 
the MDL Process, 38 LITIGATION 26 (2012). 
 34. “[L]aw in its ordinary mode of operating offers normative guidance” to citizens and 
litigants. Gerald J. Postema, Fidelity in Law’s Commonwealth, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 17, 28 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014).  
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judges and oppress rule-of-law norms by systematically screening out 
meritorious cases. 
As to the former—the encroachment of judicial power and discretion—
there is ample reason to believe that judges cannot read and analyze for 
sufficiency hundreds, maybe thousands,35 of facts sheets within ninety days 
of submission.  Given these time constraints, this provision could well be the 
death knell for MDL.  Judges in the MDL are volunteers who take on the 
important work of MDL on top of their regular caseload.  This provision 
would likely put an end to that volunteerism. 
As to the latter—oppressing access to justice and rule of law—this 
provision is at best indifferent to the scores of meritorious cases that would 
be screened out by a provision both so broad and so rigid.  To illustrate, 
imagine a fictional plaintiff, Mr. Jones.36  Mr. Jones received an injection of 
Heparin, a blood thinner.  So far as we know, Heparin is generally safe.  Some 
people, however, received Heparin injections pulled from one of many 
batches manufactured in China, which contained a dangerous contaminant—
so dangerous, in fact, that this contaminant has caused 149 deaths in U.S. 
patients in 2007 and 2008.37 
How is Mr. Jones (or his estate) supposed to craft a section 105(i) fact 
statement in forty-five days?  Mr. Jones needs discovery on any number of 
issues:  Where were the tainted batches distributed?  What facilities actually 
received and used the tainted batches?  What batch did his injection come 
from?  Where was his batch manufactured?  Where was his batch screened?  
And so on.  Mr. Jones does not have access to that information; the defendant 
does.  And Mr. Jones cannot expect to get discovery in the first forty-five 
days. 
Mr. Jones, then, is out of luck.  He could have all the law and facts in the 
world on his side.  Yet in the face of section 105(i), he loses.  He will not be 
the only one.  Whether it is bad-batch cases, sample cases, or any number of 
other scenarios, section 105(i) is a death knell for countless meritorious 
claims across the swath of the litigation landscape.  Quite a swipe to the rule 
of law. 
It need not be so.  To the extent reform is needed in this area, it might call 
for heightened use of existing screening mechanisms or heightened screening 
 
 35. The most extreme example is a set of MDL cases devoted to claims alleging injuries 
from pelvic mesh manufactured by Johnson & Johnson (J&J) and its subsidiaries.  All claims 
against seven different defendants have been consolidated before Judge Joseph Goodwin in 
the Southern District of West Virginia, and there have been over 80,000 claims filed. See, e.g., 
Amanda Robert, Pelvic Mesh MDL “Most Complicated in History,” Plaintiff Attorney Says, 
LEGAL NEWSLINE (Nov. 24, 2015), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/510649797-pelvic-mesh-
mdl-most-complicated-mdl-in-history-plaintiff-attorney-says [https://perma.cc/B2P6-PPTC].  
 36. This fictional plaintiff is based on plaintiffs that were involved in real cases involving 
contaminated batches of the drug Heparin. See, e.g., Estate of Johansen v. Baxter, No. 09 L 
11175, 2011 WL 2976812 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 9, 2011) (awarding $625,000 to plaintiffs’ estate 
after Steven Johansen died as a result of receiving contaminated Heparin from the defendant). 
 37. Zachary Brennan, Congressmen Slam FDA’s Handling of Investigation into Tainted 
Chinese Heparin, REG. AFF. PROFESSIONALS SOC’Y (Mar. 30, 2016), 
https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus™/news-articles/2016/3/congressmen-slam-fda’s-
handling-of-investigation-into-tainted-chinese-heparin [https://perma.cc/J2K7-HNPT]. 
2018] ENCROACHMENTS AND OPPRESSIONS 2121 
by the transferor court.  Reform might well involve fact sheets, but 
submission and review ought not be encumbered by such obviously anti-
litigation, anticourt time limits.  Nor should they be saddled with anti-rule-
of-law requirements of proving a key element like causation at the outset of 
a case.  Such reforms, or others like them, would strive to be consistent, not 
at odds, with the purposes of the MDL statute, the judicial power to manage 
its cases, and the judicial role vis-à-vis rule of law.  The problem with 
corporate access to the legislature in procedural reform, however, is precisely 
what one sees in this and other provisions of FICALA:  a total (maybe even 
willful) insensitivity to the judiciary’s independent power to manage its 
courts and cases and to the critical role of the judiciary in preserving the rule 
of law. 
B.  House Bill 985 Section 105(k):  
Required Appeals from Nonfinal Orders 
Section 105(k),38 which provides that MDL judges must permit appeals 
from any order that “may materially advance the ultimate termination of one 
or more civil actions in the proceedings,”39 is also anticourt and anti-rule of 
law.  This provision is a not so thinly veiled request by corporate entities for 
Congress to lick particular litigation wounds40 with seemingly little concern 
for its effect on long-standing judicial precedent, power, and discretion in the 
process.  While corporate defendants and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
have insisted—orally—that section 105(k) is only intended to apply to 
“certain types” of orders, there is no language in the bill to that effect.41  
Whatever the so-called intended scope of the language, given the current 
deregulatory inclinations of Congress, corporate entities have little incentive 
to narrow this provision.  This provision spares these entities the difficult 
practice of making their products safer,42 or of seeking substantive products-
 
 38. Given the limitations of this short piece, I omit from discussion section 105(j) of 
House Bill 985, though it warrants brief mention.  Section 105(j) prohibits the judge to whom 
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation assigns actions from “conduct[ing] a trial . . . 
transferred to or directly filed in the proceedings unless all parties to that civil action consent.”  
H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105(j) (2017).  This provision may well not do much work in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s clear opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 
137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), but in any case, the gambit of this provision was to restrict access to 
trials in what defendants view as and the American Tort Reform Association refers to as 
“Judicial Hellholes.”  
 39. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105(i). 
 40. Indeed, and particularly given the statements of J&J’s attorneys that Congress wrote 
the provisions of House Bill 985 “based on their experience” on the ground in MDL litigation, 
this provision seems a rather direct response to J&J’s dissatisfaction with Judge Ed Kinkeade’s 
denial of J&J’s motions to exclude some of plaintiffs’ experts and denial of motions for new 
trial in the In re Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Pinnacle Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation, 
No. 3:11-MD-2244-K, 2017 WL 4122625 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2017).  
 41. Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Conference Livestream, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/blog-posts/multidistrict-litigation-mdl-conference 
[https://perma.cc/H2S9-D8K4]. 
 42. See, e.g., Charmaine Lloyd v. Johnson & Johnson (In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum 
Powder Cases), No. BC628228, 2017 WL 4780572, at *1 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 
2017) (discussing a product known by J&J to be carcinogenic but sold anyway); Ebaugh v. 
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liability legislation from Congress.  Instead, it provides a quick and 
nonsalient political solution:  grind MDL to a halt through unlimited appeal 
under a hopelessly vague standard of whether, in any given case, an order 
“materially advance[s] the ultimate termination of . . . the proceedings.”43 
To be clear, it is not the case that corporate entities have no avenues for 
discretionary appeal in the courts.  Nor is it true that those entities are failing 
to avail themselves of these existing mechanisms.  Instead, because district 
courts are not granting requests for appeal as often as corporate entities might 
like, those entities look to Congress to encroach upon that discretion. 
Section 105(k) places into stark relief the power struggle between 
Congress and the judiciary over procedure and case management.  The 
recently reiterated view of the Court—the same anti-litigation Court 
referenced earlier—is that appeals from nonfinal judgments ought to be very 
rare.44  It is for very good reasons that even an anti-litigation court would 
resist attempts to flout the final judgment rule.  Without it, cases get unduly 
delayed, generate unwarranted costs, and get caught in a game of ping-pong 
between the district courts and the courts of appeals.45  A legislative 
encroachment upon the judiciary’s discretion over nonmandatory appeals 
would pit this Congress not only against the current Court but against the 
Committee on Rules on Practice and Procedure (comprised of then-Judge 
Gorsuch), which rejected an almost-identical reform provision just last 
year.46  This Congress would also place itself at odds with the Rules Advisory 
Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2016, which rejected a 
provision almost identical to section 105(k) that was proposed as an 
amendment to Rule 23.47 
If granted, this request would not simply have anticourt effects, but it 
would also have anti-rule-of-law effects.  Section 105(k) invites abuse by 
both sides—it is not as if defendants would be the only parties filing motions 
for appeal when dissatisfied with a ruling.  The natural and normatively 
undesirable effects of a provision subject to two-sided abuse are relatively 
obvious:  it grinds litigation to a halt, mires proceedings in endless appeals, 
and potentially discourages MDLs altogether, either because litigants avoid 
them or judges stop volunteering to preside over them.  These effects seem 
to be the strategic gambit of FICALA’s proponents.48 
 
Ethicon, No. 130700866, 2017 WL 4181739, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 7, 2017) (discussing 
a product known by J&J to cause perforation of pelvic organs but sold anyway). 
 43. H.R. 985 § 105 (k)(1). 
 44. See, e.g., Microsoft v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1707 (2017). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Letter from Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, to Judge Bob Goodlatte (Feb. 
14, 2017).  
 47. Section 105(k) also pits this Congress against a Congress that preceded it.  Because of 
concerns about undue delay, unwarranted costs, and prolific satellite litigation, the 109th 
Congress rejected a provision almost identical to section 105(k) when it passed the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 
28 U.S.C.). 
 48. MDL judges already can certify orders for interlocutory appeals; if parties fail to 
obtain such an order, that party may seek a writ of mandamus. 
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C.  House Bill 985 Section 105(l):  
“Ensuring Proper Recovery for Plaintiffs” 
On any number of fronts—including the preservation of rule of law and 
access to justice—the title of this provision, “Ensuring Proper Recovery for 
Plaintiffs,” portends a needed reform goal.  Section 105(l) seeks to achieve 
this aim by providing that plaintiffs must receive 80 percent of the proceeds 
from any recovery obtained via settlement or judgment.49  That leaves 20 
percent for plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
How we actually achieve proper recovery for plaintiffs in mass litigation 
is a complex question and the answer goes beyond the scope of this short 
Article.50  However, the answer, in its simplest form, is two-fold:  (1) align 
attorneys’ incentives to recover with plaintiffs’ incentives and (2) align the 
total amount of plaintiffs’ attorney fees with plaintiffs’ actual recovery.  In 
short, create a structure whereby attorneys’ zealous representation of clients’ 
interests also serves the attorneys’ pecuniary interests.  Section 105(l) does 
neither. 
Instead, section 105(l) imposes a price regulation that blatantly interferes 
with the free market for legal services and goes far toward ensuring that 
plaintiffs will not obtain a proper recovery.  This is an ironic ask by corporate 
entities who have argued vociferously for the last decade that neither the 
Court nor Congress should interfere with the free market for procedural 
provisions in arbitration contracts.  How quickly the champions of the free 
market embrace “big government” paternalism when it reduces their 
exposure to liability!  Rather than displaying a theoretical coherence among 
policy and procedural reform proposals,51 then, corporate entities seek to 
obtain some of the very gains Hamilton feared:  encroachment upon judicial 
independence and the rule of law. 
While 80 percent may sound like a good deal for plaintiffs, more is not 
always more.  Plaintiffs will have tremendous difficulty finding qualified 
counsel to represent them under this below-market fee structure.  
Diminishing the amount of potential recovery well below market value 
makes taking on MDL cases much riskier for attorneys.  When one subtracts 
the amount a given attorney must pay to lead attorneys in an MDL in the form 
of common-benefit fees,52 and the attorney’s own investment in the case 
(which often includes footing the bill for expensive experts), a 20 percent cut 
is often not going to be high enough to justify an attorney’s investment. 
The consequences of section 105(l) for plaintiff recovery and rule-of-law 
norms are not difficult to predict.  First, many attorneys simply will not take 
cases, no matter how meritorious.  Second, even if an attorney does take on 
 
 49. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105(l)(b) (2017). 
 50. For a discussion regarding plaintiffs’ remedies in MDL, see generally Elizabeth 
Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2017). 
 51. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
221, 244 (2017) (demonstrating the theoretical incoherence among free-market views 
regarding claim alienation within both the plaintiffs’ and defense bar).  
 52. See generally William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Common Benefit Fee” Is, Is Not, 
and Should Be, CLASS ACTION ATT’Y FEE DIG., March 2009, at 87, 87. 
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some cases, that attorney now has the following predictable but highly 
undesirable incentive:  package as many plaintiffs together as possible, as 
quickly as possible, for a settlement that reflects litigation risk rather than 
case merits.  Despite this subsection’s title—which suggests that its contents 
serve the interests of plaintiffs and the rule of law—it actually seems to serve 
defendants’ interests in eliminating litigation or, at the very least, achieving 
finality inexpensively.  Yet nothing about the status quo or in the empirical 
evidence53 demonstrates that this sort of price regulation is required to 
recalibrate some injustice defendants are suffering.54 
Moreover, like section 105(k), section 105(l) highlights the negative 
effects of a procedural power struggle between the judiciary and Congress.  
Judges typically exercise control over fee awards in light of the various 
exigencies of the cases.  Under this provision, judges are given no room to 
help craft an admittedly needed solution regarding plaintiff recovery, despite 
their having vastly superior expertise and discretionary ability. 
Interestingly, one potential starting point for such a solution, which 
expressly harnesses judicial expertise to carry out, is found in the class action 
portion of FICALA.  Section 103(a) provides that “any attorneys’ fee award 
to class counsel that is attributed to the monetary recovery shall be limited to 
a reasonable percentage of any payments directly distributed to and received 
by class members.”55  This explicitly aligns attorneys’ fees with actual 
plaintiff recovery, yet it leaves in place judicial discretion to award a 
reasonable percentage of that recovery to the attorneys.  Section 105(l) does 
not attempt such a structure and instead attempts to eliminate access to justice 
and hinder the preservation of rule of law altogether. 
None of the foregoing is to say that MDL is perfect or that corporate 
litigants and lobbyists lack legitimate complaints.  Nor is it necessarily to 
fault any entity, corporate or otherwise, for taking strategic advantage where 
they can or to offer predictions regarding FICALA’s fate.56  This discussion 
is offered, instead, both to situate FICALA within a long line of corporate-
led procedural-reform efforts and to illustrate the existence and consequences 
of a procedural power struggle between the judiciary and Congress.  This 
 
 53. See generally Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”:  Class Certification and 
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (showing empirically that defendants are not being 
cheated in the mass litigation settlement process).  
 54. If anything, MDL is beneficial to defendants:  if a defendant wins a motion to dismiss, 
a large evidentiary motion, or a motion for summary judgment, the defendant wins across a 
broad swath of cases—not just a single action.  Further, defendants can resolve thousands of 
claims in one fell swoop. 
 55. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 103(a) (2017).  Indeed, this notion is precisely what scholars, 
judges, and lawyers of all stripes agreed to in the American Law Institute’s Principles of the 
Law of Aggregate Litigation section 3.13(a):  “Attorneys’ fees in class actions, whether by 
litigated judgment or by settlement, should be based on both the actual value of the judgment 
or settlement to the class . . . .” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.13(a) 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 56. Serious reform debates continue, whatever FICALA’s ultimate fate. See, e.g., 
Symposium, Civil Litigation Reform in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018) (featuring a panel on MDL reforms); Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Conference 
Livestream, supra note 41 (discussing MDL problems, reform efforts, and ideas for reform).  
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power struggle has led to reform efforts that tend to be rather insensitive to 
encroachments upon judicial discretion, access to justice, or the preservation 
of rule of law; indeed, they are often specifically aimed at achieving such 
encroachments.  This state of affairs has a number of implications and raises 
a number of important questions about procedural theory, democratic 
legitimacy, misalignment of resources in litigation, and a host of others.  
Part III of this Article begins this inquiry by exploring questions involving 
the scope of judicial and congressional power over procedure, with special 
attention to each branch’s distinct role. 
III.  SEPARATION-OF-POWERS IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE CORPORATIZATION OF PROCEDURE 
The power struggle between the judiciary and Congress over matters of 
procedure, illustrated above by FICALA, has led to the increased 
politicization of procedure in both branches.57  Further, it may well explain 
the judiciary’s recent tendency toward favoring corporate litigants in its 
procedural decisions.58  After all, if moneyed corporate interests can obtain 
congressional intervention in procedural matters in ways that are indifferent 
to effects on judicial power, the judiciary has a greater incentive to hold onto 
that power by preventing such matters from ever getting to Congress, perhaps 
even by ceding as far as they are willing to grant corporate anti-litigation and 
anti-rule-of-law requests. 
Underlying this asserted connection between rule of law and procedure are 
two related premises.  First, as many scholars have recognized, private law 
and the rule of law are inextricably interconnected; indeed, sometimes more 
so than public law and rule of law, which constitute the traditional doctrinal 
frame.59  Second, and less discussed in rule-of-law literature, is the integral 
role of procedure—the mechanisms of private enforcement—to the 
preservation of the rule of law.60  Procedure has long been the battleground 
for corporate litigants and lobbyists,61 which reveals that this connection is 
well understood by those who seek to limit their exposure to liability.  That 
 
 57. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded 
Assertions:  An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989). 
 58. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 14, at 1146 (describing the Court’s deregulatory 
procedural decisions); Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11, at 1627 
(analyzing the Supreme Court’s “anti-class action” jurisprudence and finding that its decisions 
are more a reflection of implicit substantive choices). 
 59. See generally William Lucy, The Rule of Law and Private Law, in PRIVATE LAW AND 
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 34, at 41; Postema, supra note 34, at 17; Henry E. Smith, 
Property, Equity, and the Rule of Law, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 34, 
at 224; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts and the Rule of Law, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF 
LAW, supra note 34, at 139. 
 60. For an exploration of the connection between procedure and rule of law and related 
ideas of substantive justice, see generally BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 11; SEAN 
FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010); Glover, supra note 14; Lawrence B. Solum, 
Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004).  
 61. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 2, at 1739; see also supra note 25 and accompanying 
text.   
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connection is readily observed in recent procedural opinions—opinions that, 
beneath the surface, represent a judiciary stretching the limits of its 
procedural powers to achieve more “substantive” aims under the less-salient 
veil of procedure.62  These two premises, the foundations of which have been 
detailed in the prior work of others and myself, reveal that the entities—be 
they plaintiffs, corporations, judges, or members of Congress—that have 
control over judicial procedure also have great control over the preservation, 
or nonpreservation, of the rule of law. 
This, however, was not always the case.  Elected branches of government 
have not always been as indifferent to—or in some cases, fervently devoted 
to—the diminishment of judicial power or the judicial role to preserve rule 
of law.  Today, however, the national discourse, not to mention our Twitter 
feeds, are filled with attacks on intertwined notions of rule of law and judicial 
independence.  These attacks, while far less eloquent than those leveled 
against Hamilton’s conception of the judiciary at the time of the 
Constitution’s framing, are nonetheless far more persistent, more salacious, 
and—given that many of these assaults can emanate from the President of the 
United States—perhaps far more concerning.63  And these largely 
unprecedented64 attacks on the rule of law from the President exist alongside 
a deregulatory Congress whose legislation and rhetoric has heightened what 
 
 62. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1739–40 (noting that courts risk Congress’s ire when 
their procedural power is exercised in ways that attempt to conceal substantive ends).  See 
generally Glover, Disappearing Claims, supra note 11; Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” 
Class Action, supra note 11.  
 63. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians That Firing ‘Nut Job’ Comey 
Eased Pressure from Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/05/19/us/politics/trump-russia-comey.html [https://perma.ccQHP7-BD7U]; Jeremy 
Diamond, Trump ‘Disappointed’ in Sessions, Won’t Say If He Wants Him out, CNN (July 25, 
2017, 5:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/25/politics/trump-press-conference/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3Y2D-QQQE] (expressing anger that Attorney General Sessions recused 
himself from the Russia investigation).  Some of the most publicly salient attacks on the 
judiciary and the rule of law have emerged from the tweets of Donald Trump.  For example, 
after a federal judge struck down Trump’s immigration ban as unconstitutional, Trump 
threatened the judge via tweet:  “Just cannot believe a judge would put our country in such 
peril.  If something happens[,] blame him and court system.  People pouring in.  Bad!” Donald 
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 3:39 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
realdonaldtrump/status/828342202174668800 [https://perma.cc/PJG8-KEVD].  Trump also 
referred to this same judge as a “so-called judge” whose decision was “ridiculous and [would] 
be overturned!” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 8:12 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827867311054974976 [https://perma.cc/3YVR-
2F2Z].  Trump has also questioned the impartiality of a Mexican American judge in litigation 
related to Trump University, on the ground that the judge is Mexican American. Donald J. 
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 30, 2016, 2:45 PM), https://twitter.com/real 
DonaldTrump/status/737399475509985280 [https://perma.cc/9M4U-RDQ9] (calling Judge 
Gonzalo Curiel “very unfair” and “[t]otally biased”). 
 64. There is at least one notable historical precedent:  President Jackson refused to abide 
by Justice John Marshall’s order not to displace the Cherokee Indians; Jackson sent them out 
anyway and famously proclaimed, “Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.” 
Jeffrey Rosen, Not Even Andrew Jackson Went as Far as Trump in Attacking the Courts, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/a-historical-
precedent-for-trumps-attack-on-judges/516144/ [https://perma.cc/AJ2Q-9ZKL].  President 
Jackson’s executively ordered mass exodus is now known as the Trail of Tears and remains 
one of the most shameful events in our nation’s history. 
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was already a growing level of “encroachment and oppression” of the judicial 
role to preserve the rule of law.  Though many factors affect the judiciary’s 
ability to preserve the rule of law, it seems that our current political climate 
combined with our structure for procedural reform—whereby corporate 
entities have multiple channels through which they can effectuate anti-rule-
of-law procedural measures—ought to be more thoroughly considered and 
theorized.  While this Article cannot do that task justice, it can offer some 
preliminary thoughts. 
Keeping intact the current understanding of judicial power over 
procedure—in other words, keeping constant the notion that the judiciary has 
delegated supervisory power over procedure, subject to the limitations in the 
Rules Enabling Act65—there nonetheless exist structural separation-of-
powers and federalism constraints that could better align procedural reform 
and procedural power with the role of the judiciary to preserve the rule of 
law.  Both the Enabling Act, which purports to operationalize judicial power 
over procedure, and the related Erie doctrine, which purports to set up 
constitutional limits on federal court lawmaking power, draw separation-of-
powers lines that, if properly understood, might provide guidance as to when 
and whether either the legislative or the judicial branch is most appropriately 
involved with a particular procedural reform.  These limitations ought to be 
guided by the institutional characteristics and roles of the legislature on the 
one hand and the judiciary on the other. 
In diversity cases, federal courts are required by the Erie doctrine to steer 
clear of interference with state substantive lawmaking prerogatives.  In 
federal question cases, federal courts have more breathing room vis-à-vis 
interpretation of substantive law but must adhere to the separation-of-powers 
limitations in the Rules Enabling Act, which precludes them from 
encroaching on Congress’s lawmaking power.  Moreover, as a matter of 
democratic legitimacy and structural constitutionalism, major changes in 
substantive law are better left to the more transparent and democratic 
processes that characterize the legislative branch.66  Thus, as I have detailed 
in prior work, federal courts may apply different procedural rules in different 
substantive contexts only if those differences stem from the dictates of the 
underlying substantive law.67  Otherwise, the judiciary would run afoul of 
legislative power.  I term this theory of judicial procedural power the 
“principle of procedural symmetry,” and I offered it in prior work as a 
challenge to the transsubstantivity principle that has long been used to 
operationalize the Rules Enabling Act.68  This principle helps capture the 
dual power of the judiciary and Congress over both procedure and 
substantive lawmaking (at least in federal question cases) and could help 
police the line between the two branches in matters of procedural reform. 
 
 65. See Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11, at 1628–29.  
 66. Burbank, supra note 2, at 1679.  
 67. See Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11, at 1660. 
 68. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”). 
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To illustrate the purchase these principles could have with regard to 
preserving the rule of law, consider the following procedural-reform power 
struggles.  First, one of the more heated debates during the passage of the 
PSLRA was whether Congress was intruding upon the judiciary’s power over 
procedure (not to mention its expertise).69  Under both the symmetry 
principle and institutional constraints on the judiciary, this debate was 
misplaced.  The PSLRA ultimately created a substance-specific procedural 
regime for securities fraud, something arguably beyond the scope of the 
judicial power over procedure under the symmetry principle, and certainly 
beyond its institutional role to preserve, not recalibrate, the rule of law.  
Indeed, a heightened pleading rule just for securities laws must emanate from 
the substantive law of securities itself, at least absent a substantive judicial 
interpretation of section 10(b)(5) of the Securities Act of 1933 that would 
dictate a different application of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  In short, such a proclamation of the substantive contours of 
securities laws needed to emanate from Congress.  The PSLRA may well 
have impacted the ease with which private litigants could bring securities 
claims, but the enlargement or retrenchment of substantive rights is most 
properly within the ambit of the legislative branch; the judiciary can only 
“preserve” the rule of law vis-à-vis the laws it is given to enforce. 
In contrast, broad, transsubstantive enactments like the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) have rightly been criticized as encroachments 
upon the province and expertise of the judiciary and the rulemaking 
process.70  The same sorts of criticisms can be leveled against FICALA.  
Here, instead of tackling the substantive issue of products-liability law, 
Congress seeks to fight that war through reform to the MDL procedures as a 
whole.  Moreover, unlike the PSLRA, which generated robust lobbying from 
both sides of the securities bar,71 broad-sweeping procedural reform like the 
CJRA and the FICALA tends not to mobilize the concomitantly diffuse swath 
of litigants who might one day be affected by it.72  Instead, these reforms 
would truly intrude or encroach upon the supervisory power of the judiciary 
to craft and enforce procedures to manage the courts and would oppress the 
judiciary’s ability to fulfill its role in preserving the rule of law.73 
 
 69. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 2, at 1708–12. 
 70. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 
MINN. L. REV. 375, 379 (1992) (arguing that the CJRA “has effected a revolutionary 
redistribution of the procedural rulemaking power from the federal judicial branch to the 
legislative branch”). 
 71. See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform:  The Long and Winding Road to the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 338 (1996) (noting that 
the debate for reform in private securities litigation was “propelled primarily by those whose 
interests [were] most directly affected, with the accounting firms and the issuer community on 
one side and the plaintiffs’ bar on the other”). 
 72. See generally Glover, Disappearing Claims, supra note 11. 
 73. And just as critics of the CJRA warned, the legislative process lacks the rigorous 
empirical work needed for broad-sweeping reform—a fact on blatant display in the House 
report on FICALA, which does not cite a single empirical study. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-25 
(2017). 
2018] ENCROACHMENTS AND OPPRESSIONS 2129 
The limitation with the separation of powers on the relative powers of 
Congress and the judiciary over procedure—operationalized in large part by 
the procedural symmetry principle—provides guidance for the judiciary as 
well.  Consider the sweeping procedural reform achieved by corporate 
litigants in the class-arbitration cases.  While most of the arbitration cases did 
not directly implicate the Rules Enabling Act or the Erie doctrine, concerns 
about separation of powers were present.74  In the arbitration cases, the Court 
was asked to interpret a federal procedural statute, the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA), and apply it in different substantive contexts (for instance, 
consumer fraud and federal antitrust law).  To the extent the Court’s 
interpretation of a procedural statute75 conflicted with the dictates of an 
existing and duly enacted substantive statute, it is a long-standing canon of 
construction that the (relatively) substantive federal statute must prevail over 
the (relatively) procedural one.  This canon of construction exists 
harmoniously with the principle of procedural symmetry:  variances in 
application of procedural rules in different substantive contexts are 
permissible so long as the dictates arise from substantive law; variances in 
the application of substantive law across procedural contexts are not. 
The Court, however, in a formalistic power grab, ignored these separation-
of-powers concerns altogether—a move it has made in contexts beyond 
arbitration.76  Whether the currently anti-litigation Congress would have 
agreed with the Court’s ultimate results in these cases is of little importance.  
What matters, instead, is that in its arbitration cases, the Court recalibrated 
the remedial scheme for the swath of federal substantive statutes without any 
congressional input on any of those statutes, much less the particular ones at 
issue in the cases the Court considered.77  Instead of staying within the 
confines of preserving the rule of law, the Court recalibrated that law—a role 
more appropriately undertaken by a democratically accountable legislature. 
The foregoing is sufficient only to offer the following modest conclusion:  
any approach to procedural reform ought to take into account the separation-
of-powers limitations and institutional-role differences briefly discussed 
here.  Instead of a dual-branch procedural reform buffet for corporate entities, 
procedural reform should stem either from the dictates of substantive law or 
from the relatively depoliticized Rules Advisory Committee process and 
 
 74. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s imposition of procedural bars to stating claims 
betrays federal statutes like the antitrust laws).  
 75. Here, “procedural” is relative to other legislative enactments governing primary 
conduct. See id. at 2318–19. 
 76. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 
U.S. 720 (1977).  
 77. For instance, the Court could have reached a narrower holding in Italian Colors on 
the ground that it need not reach the separation-of-powers question because Congress, in 
enacting the Sherman Act, considered and rejected a class action provision.  Though the issue 
was briefed, see, e.g., Brief of the American Antitrust Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 17–18, Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (No. 12-133), the Court did not consider 
it, instead issuing a sweeping holding that would affect all federal statutes, Italian Colors, 133 
S. Ct. at 2311–12 n.4 (mentioning the Sherman Act only in a footnote in reference to Justice 
Kagan’s dissenting opinion).  
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appropriately constrained procedural decision-making by courts.  Such a 
change, though seemingly modest, could begin restoring Hamilton’s 
intended role for the judiciary to preserve the rule of law and to reduce the 
“encroachments and oppressions” on that role he so feared. 
CONCLUSION 
Much additional work is needed on this topic, as well as on various other 
matters of procedural power.78  It is also true that there are many reasons 
beyond mere power struggles that explain the corporatization of procedure:  
the increased politicization of judicial appointments; the anti-litigation stance 
of the Court filled with many of those more “politicized” appointees;79 the 
long-standing perception of a litigation explosion in the United States;80 an 
increasingly far-right and deregulatory Congress and executive; and a lack of 
campaign-finance reform, among others.  All of these considerations should 
give us pause in believing that there is, in fact, a nonpoliticized branch with 
which we can entrust matters of “procedure.”  They further demonstrate that 
there is no single solution. 
That the problem of procedural regulation is complex, however, cannot 
justify too much pause.  The rule of law is not only caught in a procedural 
power struggle that often results in its diminishment—including by the 
branch entrusted with its preservation—but it is also under direct attack from 
elected members of federal and state governments.  As a result, separation-
of-powers considerations may have never mattered more.  In matters of 
procedure and in matters of governance, there has perhaps never been a 
greater need for restraint and respect. 
 
 
 78. For instance, there is the lingering question of the judiciary’s “inherent” power over 
procedure. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1, 24 (1985).  
 79. See, e.g., BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 11, at 244; LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA 
MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE (2014). 
 80. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 596 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (expressing the Supreme Court’s belief that district judges were not skilled at 
controlling discovery costs).   
